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Abstract
We consider the problem of converting an arbitrary approximation algorithm for a single-
parameter optimization problem into a computationally efficient truthful mechanism. We ask
for reductions that are black-box, meaning that they require only oracle access to the given
algorithm and in particular do not require explicit knowledge of the problem constraints. Such
a reduction is known to be possible, for example, for the social welfare objective when the goal
is to achieve Bayesian truthfulness and preserve social welfare in expectation. We show that a
black-box reduction for the social welfare objective is not possible if the resulting mechanism is
required to be truthful in expectation and to preserve the worst-case approximation ratio of the
algorithm to within a subpolynomial factor. Further, we prove that for other objectives such as
makespan, no black-box reduction is possible even if we only require Bayesian truthfulness and
an average-case performance guarantee.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design studies optimization problems arising in settings involving selfish agents, with
the goal of designing a system or protocol whereby agents’ individual selfish optimization leads to
global optimization of a desired objective. A central theme in algorithmic mechanism design is
to reconcile the incentive constraints of selfish participants with the requirement of computational
tractability and to understand whether the combination of these two considerations limits algorithm
design in a way that each one alone does not.
In the best-case scenario, one might hope for a sort of equivalence between the considerations of
algorithm design and mechanism design. In particular, recent research has explored general reduc-
tions that convert an arbitrary approximation algorithm into an incentive compatible mechanism.
Ideally, these reductions have an arbitrarily small loss in performance, and are black-box in the
sense that they need not understand the underlying structure of the given algorithm or problem
constraints. A big benefit of this approach is that it allows a practitioner to ignore incentive con-
straints while fine-tuning his algorithm to the observed workload. Of course the feasibility of the
approach depends heavily on the objective at hand as well as the incentive requirements. The goal
of this paper is to understand what scenarios enable such black-box reductions.
The classic result of Vickrey, Clarke and Groves provides a positive result along these lines for
social welfare maximization. Social welfare maximization is a standard objective in mechanism
design. Here, a central authority wishes to assist a group of individuals in choosing from among
a set of outcomes with the goal of maximizing the total outcome value to all participants. The
Vickrey, Clarke and Groves result demonstrates that for any such problem, there exists a mechanism
that maximizes social welfare with very robust incentive properties (namely, it is ex post incentive
compatible). This construction requires that the mechanism optimize social welfare precisely, and
so can be thought of as a reduction from incentive compatible mechanism design to exact algorithm
design. This result can be extended to more general scenarios beyond social welfare. In the single-
parameter setting, where the preferences of every selfish agent can be described by a single scalar
parameter, (Bayesian or ex post) incentive compatibility is essentially equivalent to a per-agent
monotonicity condition on the allocation returned by the mechanism. Therefore, for objective
functions that are “monotone” in the sense that exact optimization of the objective leads to a
monotone allocation function, there is a reduction from mechanism design to exact algorithm
design along the lines of the VCG mechanism for social welfare.
However, many settings of interest involve constraints which are computationally infeasible to
optimize precisely, and so exact algorithms are not known to exist. Recent work [12, 11, 4] shows
that in Bayesian settings of partial information, the reduction from mechanism design to algorithm
design for social welfare can be extended to encompass arbitrary approximate algorithms with
arbitrarily small loss in expected performance. These reductions work even in multi-parameter
settings. Moreover, these reductions are black-box, meaning that they require only oracle access
to the prior type distributions and the algorithm, and proceed without knowledge of the feasibility
constraints of the problem to be solved.
In light of this positive result, two natural questions arise:
• Are there black-box reductions transforming approximation algorithms for social welfare into
ex post incentive compatible mechanisms with little loss in worst-case approximation ratio?
• Does every monotone objective admit a black-box reduction that transforms approximation
algorithms into (Bayesian or ex post) incentive compatible mechanisms with little loss in
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(worst-case or average) approximation ratio?
In this paper we answer both of these questions in the negative. Our impossibility results apply to
the simpler class of single-parameter optimization problems.
The first question strengthens the demands of the reduction beyond those of the aforementioned
positive results [12, 11, 4] in two significant ways. First, it requires the stronger solution concept of
ex post incentive compatibility, rather than Bayesian incentive compatibility. Second, it requires
that the approximation factor of the original algorithm be preserved in the worst case over all
possible inputs, rather than in expectation. It is already known that such reductions are not possible
for general multi-parameter social welfare problems. For some multi-parameter problems, no ex
post incentive compatible mechanism can match the worst-case approximation factors achievable
by algorithms without game-theoretic constraints [16, 8]. Thus, for general social welfare problems,
the relaxation from an ex post, worst-case setting to a Bayesian setting provably improves one’s
ability to implement algorithms as mechanisms. However, prior to our work, it was not known
whether a lossless black-box reduction could exist for the important special case of single-parameter
problems. We show that any such reduction for single-parameter problems must sometimes degrade
an algorithm’s worst-case performance by a factor that is polynomial in the problem size.
The second question asks whether there are properties specific to social welfare that enable the
computationally efficient reductions of the above results [12, 11, 4]. One property that appears
to be crucial in their analysis is the linearity of the objective in both the agents’ values and the
algorithm’s allocations. For our second impossibility result we consider the (highly non-linear but
monotone) makespan objective for scheduling problems. In a scheduling problem we are given a
number of (selfish) machines and jobs; our goal is to schedule the jobs on the machines in such a way
that the load on the most loaded machine (namely, the makespan of the schedule) is minimized.
The sizes of jobs on machines are private information that the machines possess and must be
incentivized to share with the algorithm.
Ashlagi et al. [2] showed that for the makespan objective in multi-parameter settings (that
is, when the sizes of jobs on different machines are unrelated), ex post incentive compatibility
imposes a huge cost: while constant factor approximations can be obtained in the absence of
incentive constraints, no “anonymous” mechanism can obtain a sublinear approximation ratio under
the requirement of incentive compatibility. The situation for single-parameter settings is quite
different. In single-parameter (a.k.a. related) settings, each machine has a single private parameter,
namely its speed, and each job has a known intrinsic size; the load that a job places on a machine
is its size divided by the speed of the machine. In such settings in the absence of feasibility
constraints, deterministic PTASes are known both with and without incentives. Given this positive
result one might expect that for single-parameter makespan minimization there is no gap between
algorithm design and mechanism design, at least in the weaker Bayesian setting where the goal is
to achieve Bayesian incentive compatibility and match the algorithm’s expected performance. We
show that this is not true—any black-box reduction that achieves Bayesian incentive compatibility
must sometimes make the expected makespan worse by a factor polynomial in the problem size.
Finally, while makespan is quite different from social welfare, one might ask whether there exist
objectives that share some of the nice properties of social welfare that enable reductions in the style
of [11] and others. At a high level, the black-box reductions for social welfare perform“ironing”
operations for each agent independently fixing non-monotonicities in the algorithm’s output in a
local fashion without hurting the overall social welfare. One property of social welfare that enables
such an approach is that it is additive across agents. In our final result we show that even restricting
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attention to objectives that are additive across agents, for almost any objective other than social
welfare no per-agent ironing procedure can simultaneously ensure Bayesian incentive compatibility
as well as a bounded loss in performance. The implication for mechanism design is that any
successful reduction must take a holistic approach over agents and look very different from those
known for social welfare.
Our results and techniques. As mentioned earlier, the existence of a black-box reduction from
mechanism design to algorithm design can depend on the objective function we are optimizing,
the incentive requirements, as well as whether we are interested in a worst-case or average-case
performance guarantee. We distinguish between two kinds of incentive requirements (see formal
definitions in Section 2). Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) implies that truthtelling forms
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium under the assumption that the agents’ value distributions are common
knowledge. The stronger notion of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC), a.k.a. universal truth-
fulness, implies that every agent maximizes her utility by truthtelling regardless of others’ actions
and the mechanism’s coin flips. For randomized mechanisms there is a weaker notion of truthful-
ness called truthfulness in expectation (TIE) which implies that every agent maximizes her utility
in expectation over the randomness in the mechanism by truthtelling regardless of others’ actions.
We further distinguish between social welfare and arbitrary monotone objectives, and between the
average performance of the algorithm and its worst case performance.
Table 1 below summarizes our findings as well as known results along these three dimensions.
Essentially, we find that there is a dichotomy of settings: some allow for essentially lossless trans-
formations whereas others suffer an unbounded loss in performance.
Objective: social welfare Objective: arbitrary monotone (e.g. makespan)
Avg-case approx Worst-case approx
BIC Yes [12, 4, 11] ?
TIE ? No (Section 3)
Avg-case approx Worst-case approx
BIC No (Section 4) No
TIE No No
Table 1: A summary of our results on the existence of black-box transformations. A “yes” indicates
that a reduction exists and gives an arbitrarily small loss in performance; a “no” indicates that
every reduction satisfying incentive constraints suffers an arbitrarily large loss in performance.
One way to establish our impossibility results would be to demonstrate the existence of single-
parameter optimization problems for which there is a gap in the approximating power of arbitrary
algorithms and ex post incentive compatible algorithms. This is an important open problem which
has resisted much effort by the algorithmic mechanism design community, and is beyond the scope
of our work. Instead, we focus upon the black-box nature of the reductions with respect to,
in particular, the feasibility constraint that they face. Note that for single-parameter problems,
(Bayesian or ex post) incentive compatibility is essentially equivalent to a per-agent monotonicity
condition on the allocation returned by the mechanism. We construct instances that contain “hid-
den” non-monotonicities and yet provide good approximations. In order for the transformation
to be incentive compatible while also preserving the algorithm’s approximation factor, it must fix
these non-monotonicities by replacing the algorithm’s original allocation with very specific kinds
of “good” allocations. However, in order to determine which of these good allocations are also
feasible the transformation must query the original algorithm at multiple inputs with the hope of
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finding a good allocation. We construct the algorithm in such a way that any single query of the
transformation is exponentially unlikely to find a good allocation.
Related Work. Reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design in the Bayesian set-
ting were first studied by Hartline and Lucier [12], who showed that any approximation algorithm
for a single-parameter social welfare problem can be converted into a Bayesian incentive com-
patible mechanism with arbitrarily small loss in expected performance. This was extended to
multi-parameter settings by Hartline, Kleinberg and Malekian [11] and Bei and Huang [4].
Some reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design are known for prior-free settings,
for certain restricted classes of algorithms. Lavi and Swamy [15] consider mechanisms for multi-
parameter packing problems and show how to construct a (randomized) β-approximation mech-
anism that is truthful in expectation, from any β-approximation that verifies an integrality gap.
Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [10] extend the notion of designing mechanisms based upon ran-
domized rounding algorithms, and obtain truthful in expectation mechanisms for a broad class of
submodular combinatorial auctions. Dughmi and Roughgarden [9] give a construction that converts
any FPTAS algorithm for a social welfare problem into a mechanism that is truthful in expectation,
by way of a variation on smoothed analysis.
Babaioff et al. [3] provide a technique for turning a β-algorithm for a single-valued combinatorial
auction problem into a truthful β(log vmax/vmin)-approximation mechanism, when agent values are
restricted to lie in [vmin, vmax]. This reduction applies to single-parameter problems with downward-
closed feasibility constraints and binary allocations (each agent’s allocation can be either 0 or 1).
Many recent papers have explored limitations on the power of deterministic ex post incentive
compatible mechanisms to approximate social welfare. Papadimitriou, Schapira and Singer [16] gave
an example of a social welfare problem for which constant-factor approximation algorithms exist,
but any polytime ex post incentive compatible mechanism attains at best a polynomial approxi-
mation factor. A similar gap for the submodular combinatorial auction problem was established
by Dobzinski [8]. For the general combinatorial auction problem, such gaps have been established
for the restricted class of max-in-range mechanisms by Buchfuhrer et al. [5].
Truthful scheduling on related machines to minimize makespan was studied by Archer and
Tardos [1], who designed a truthful-in-expectation 3-approximation. Dhangwatnotai et al. [7] gave
a randomized PTAS that is truthful-in-expectation, which was then improved to a deterministic
truthful PTAS by Christodoulou and Kova´cs [6], matching the performance of the best possible
approximation algorithm [13]. Our work on makespan minimization differs in that we consider the
goal of minimizing makespan subject to an arbitrary feasibility constraint.
A preliminary version of this work [14] proved an impossibility result for EPIC black-box re-
ductions for single-parameter social welfare problems. In this paper we extend that result to apply
to (the broader class of) TIE reductions.
2 Preliminaries
Optimization Problems. In a single-parameter real-valued optimization problem we are given
an input vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn). Each vi is assumed to be drawn from a known set Vi ⊆ R, so
that V = V1 × · · · × Vn is the set of possible input vectors. The goal is to choose some allocation
x ∈ F ⊆ Rn from among a set of feasible allocations F such that a given objective function
φ : F × V → R is optimized (i.e. either maximized or minimized, depending on the nature of the
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problem). We think of the feasibility set F and the objective function φ as defining an instance of
the optimization problem. We will write x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), where each xi ∈ R.
An algorithm A defines a mapping from input vectors v to outcomes x. We will write A(v) for
the allocation returned by A as well as the value it obtains; the intended meaning should be clear
from the context. In general an algorithm can be randomized, in which case A(v) is a random
variable.
Given an instance F of the social welfare problem, we will write OPTF (v) for the allocation in F
that maximizes φ(x,v), as well as the value it obtains. Given algorithm A, let approxF (A) denote
the worst-case approximation ratio of A for problem F . That is, approxF (A) = minv∈V A(v)OPTF (v)
for a maximization problem; here φ is implicit and should be clear from the context. Note that
approxF (A) ≤ 1 for all F and A.
We also consider a Bayesian version of our optimization problem, in which there is publicly-
known product distribution F on input vectors. That is, F = F1×. . .×Fn and each vi is distributed
according to Fi. Given F, the expected objective value of a given algorithm A is given by φ(A) =
Ev∼F[φ(A(v),v)]. The goal of the optimization problem in this setting is to optimize the expected
objective value.
Mechanisms. We will consider our optimization problems in a mechanism design setting with n
rational agents, where each agent possesses one value from the input vector as private information.
We think of an outcome x as representing an allocation to the agents, where xi is the allocation to
agent i. A (direct-revelation) mechanism for our optimization problem then proceeds by eliciting
declared values b ∈ Rn from the agents, then applying an allocation algorithm A : Rn → F that
maps b to an allocation x, and a payment rule that maps b to a payment vector p. We will write
x(b) and p(b) for the allocations and payments that result on input b. The utility of agent i, given
that the agents declare b and his true private value is vi, is taken to be vixi(b)− pi(b).
A (possibly randomized) mechanism is truthful in expectation (TIE) if each agent maximizes its
expected utility by reporting its value truthfully, regardless of the reports of the other agents, where
expectation is taken over any randomness in the mechanism. That is, E[vixi(vi,b−i)−pi(vi,b−i)] ≥
E[vixi(bi,b−i)− pi(bi,b−i)] for all i, all vi, bi ∈ Vi, and all b−i ∈ V−i. We say that an algorithm is
TIE if there exists a payment rule such that the resulting mechanism is TIE. It is known that an
algorithm is TIE if and only if, for all i and all v−i, E[xi(vi,v−i)] is monotone non-decreasing as a
function of vi, where the expectation is over the randomness in the mechanism.
We say that a (possibly randomized) mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) for
distribution F if each agent maximizes its expected utility by reporting its value truthfully, given
that the other agents’ values are distributed according to F (and given any randomness in the
mechanism). That is, Ev−i [vixi(vi,v−i)− pi(vi,v−i)] ≥ Ev−i [vixi(bi,v−i)− pi(bi,v−i)] for all i and
all vi, bi ∈ Vi, where the expectation is over the distribution of others’ values and the randomness
in the mechanism. We say that an algorithm is BIC if there exists a payment rule such that
the resulting mechanism is BIC. It is known that an algorithm is BIC if and only if, for all i,
Ev−i [xi(vi,v−i)] is monotone non-decreasing as a function of vi.
Transformations. A polytime transformation T is an algorithm that is given black-box access
to an algorithm A. We will write T (A,v) for the allocation returned by T on input v, given that
its black-box access is to algorithm A. Then, for any A, we can think of T (A, ·) as an algorithm
that maps value vectors to allocations; we think of this as the algorithm A transformed by T .
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We write T (A) for the allocation rule that results when A is transformed by T . Note that T is
not parameterized by F ; informally speaking, T has no knowledge of the feasibility constraint F
being optimized by a given algorithm A. However, we do assume that T is aware of the objective
function φ, the domain Vi of values for each agent i, and (in Bayesian settings) the distribution F
over values.
We say that a transformation T is truthful in expectation (TIE) if, for all A, T (A) is a TIE
algorithm. In a Bayesian setting with distribution F, we say that transformation T is Bayesian
incentive compatible (BIC) for F if, for all A, T (A) is a BIC algorithm. Note that whether or not
T is TIE or BIC is independent of the objective function φ and feasibility constraint F .
3 A Lower Bound for TIE Transformations for social welfare
In this section we consider the problem of maximizing social welfare. For this problem, BIC
transformations that approximately preserve expected performance are known to exist. We prove
that if we strengthen our solution concept to truthfulness in expectation and our performance
metric to worst-case approximation, then such black-box transformations are not possible.
3.1 Problem definition and main theorem
The social welfare objective is defined as φ(x,v) = v · x.
Our main result is that, for any TIE transformation T , there is a problem instance F and
algorithm A such that T degrades the worst-case performance of A by a polynomially large factor.
Theorem 3.1. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for any polytime TIE transformation T , there
is an algorithm A and problem instance F such that approxF (A)approxF (T (A)) ≥ nc.
The high-level idea behind our proof of Theorem 3.1 is as follows. We will construct an algorithm
A and input vectors v and v′ such that, for each agent i in some large subset of the players,
vi
′ > vi but Ai(v′) < Ai(v). This does not immediately imply that A is non-truthful, but we will
show that it does imply non-truthfulness under a certain feasibility condition F , namely that any
allocation is constant on the players i with vi
′ > vi. Thus, any TIE transformation T must alter
the allocation of A either on input v or on input v′. However, we will craft our algorithm in such a
way that, on input v, the only allocations that the transformation will observe given polynomially
many queries of A will be A(v), plus allocations that have significantly worse social welfare than
A(v), with high probability. Similarly, on input v′, with high probability the transformation will
only observe allocation A(v′) plus allocations that have significantly worse social welfare than
A(v′). Furthermore, we ensure that the transformation can not even find the magnitude of the
allocation to players i in v′ when presented with input v, thereby preventing the transformation from
randomizing between the high allocation of A(v) and an essentially empty allocation to simulate
the A(v′) allocation without directly observing it. Instead, in order to guarantee that it generates
an TIE allocation rule, the transformation will be forced to assume the worst-case and offer players
i the smallest possible allocation on input v. This signifcantly worsens the worst-case performance
of the algorithm A.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Visualization of typical admissible sets of bidders V , S, and T , given size parameters r and t,
and (b) the corresponding allocations of algorithm A = AV,S,T,α.
3.2 Construction
In the instances we consider, each private value vi is chosen from {v, 1}, where 0 < v < 1 is a
parameter that we set below. That is, we will set Vi = {v, 1} for all i ∈ [n]. We can therefore
interpret an input vector as a subset y ⊆ [n], corresponding to those agents with value 1 (the
remaining agents have value v). Accordingly we define A(y), OPTF (y), etc., for a given subset
y ⊆ [n]. Also, for a ≥ 0 and y ⊆ [n], we will write xay for the allocation in which each agent i ∈ y
is allocated a, and each agent i 6∈ y is allocated 0.
Feasible Allocations. We now define a family of feasibility constraints. Roughly speaking, we
will choose α, γ ∈ (0, 1) with γ < α and sets S, T ⊆ [n] of agents. The feasible allocations will be
xγ[n], x
1
S , and x
α
T . That is, we can allocate γ to every agent, 1 to all agents in S, or α to all agents
in T . We will also require that S and T satisfy certain properties, which essentially state that S
and T are sufficiently large and have a sufficiently large intersection.
More formally, define parameters γ ∈ (0, 1), α ∈ (0, 1), r ≥ 1, and t ≥ 1 (which we will fix later
to be functions of n), such that t  r  γ−1  α−1, r5t ≤ n, and tγn  1. We think of t as a
bound on the size of “small” sets, and we think of r as a ratio between the sizes of “small” and
“large” sets.
Suppose that V , S, and T are subsets of [n]. We say that the triple V , S, T is admissible if the
following conditions hold:
1. |S| = |T | = r3t,
2. |S ∩ T | = r2t,
3. V ⊂ S ∩ T , and,
4. |V | = rt.
In general, for a given admissible V , S, and T , we will tend to write U = S ∩ T for notational
convenience. See Figure 1(a) for an illustration of the relationship between the sets in an admissible
triple. In order to hide the feasibility constraint F from the transformation, we will pick the sets
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V , S, and T uniformly at random from all admissible triples, and the value α from an appropriate
range. For each admissible tuple V , S, T , and value α, we define a corresponding feasibility
constraint
FV,S,T,α = {x1S , xαT , xγ[n]}.
Note that FV,S,T,α does not depend on V ; we include set V purely for notational convenience. We
remark that all of the feasible allocations allocate the same amount to agents in U .
Recall that agents have values chosen from {v, 1}. We will choose v = tγn , where we recall that
our parameters have been chosen so that tγn  1.
The Algorithm. We now define the algorithm AV,S,T,α corresponding to an admissible tuple
V, S, T and value α. We think of AV,S,T,α as an approximation algorithm for the social welfare
problem FV,S,T,α and later show that there is no TIE transformation ofAV,S,T,α without a significant
loss in worst-case approximation for some value of α.
Given y ⊂ [n], we define
nT (y) = |y ∩ T |+ |y ∩ U |
and
nS(y) = |y ∩ S|+ 2|y ∩ V |.
That is, nT (y) is the number of elements of y that lie in T , with elements of U counted twice.
Likewise, nS(y) is the number of elements of y that lie in S, with elements of V counted thrice.
The algorithm AV,S,T,α is then described as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Allocation Algorithm AV,S,T,α
Input: Subset y ∈ [n] of agents with value 1
Output: An allocation x ∈ FV,S,T,α
1 if nS(y) ≥ t, nS(y) ≥ γ|y|, and nS(y) ≥ nT (y) then
2 return x1S
3 else if nT (y) ≥ t, nT (y) ≥ γ|y|, and nT (y) ≥ nS(y) then
4 return xαT
5 else
6 return xγ[n]
7 end
3.3 Analysis
In this section, we derive the key lemmas for the proof of Theorem 3.1. First, we bound the
approximation factor of algorithm AV,S,T,α for problem FV,S,T,α.
Lemma 3.2. approxFV,S,T,α(AV,S,T,α) ≥ α/6.
Proof. Choose y ⊆ [n] and consider the three cases for the output of AV,S,T,α.
Case 1: nS(y) ≥ t, nS(y) ≥ γ|y|, and nS(y) ≥ nT (y). Our algorithm returns allocation x1S
and obtains welfare at least |y ∩ S|. Note that
|y ∩ S| ≥ 1
3
nS(y) ≥ 1
3
t
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and
|y ∩ S| ≥ 1
3
nS(y) ≥ 1
3
nT (y) ≥ 1
3
|y ∩ T |.
The allocation xαT obtains welfare at most α(|y∩T |+ |T\y|v) ≤ α(|y∩T |+nvγ) ≤ |y∩T |+ t ≤
6|y ∩ S|. Note that here we used |T | ≤ nγ, which follows since r > γ−1.
The allocation xγ[n] obtains welfare at most γ|y|+ t ≤ 2nS(y) ≤ 6|y ∩ S|. So we obtain at least
a 1/6-approximation in this case.
Case 2: nT (y) ≥ t, nT (y) ≥ γ|y|, and nT (y) ≥ nS(y). Our algorithm returns allocation xαT
and obtains welfare at least α|y ∩ T |. The same argument as case 1 shows that our approximation
factor is at least α/6 in this case.
Case 3: nS(y) ≤ t and nT (y) ≤ t. Our algorithm returns allocation xγ[n] for a welfare of at
least γ(|y|+ v(n− |y|)) ≥ t. The allocation x1S obtains welfare at most |y ∩S|+ t ≤ nS(y) + t ≤ 2t,
and allocation xαT obtains welfare at most 2αt ≤ 2t. So our approximation factor is at least 1/2 in
this case.
Case 4: nS(y) ≤ γ|y| and nT (y) ≤ γ|y|. Our algorithm returns allocation xγ[n] for a welfare of at
least γ(|y|+v(n−|y|)) ≥ γ|y|. The allocation x1S obtains welfare at most |y∩S|+t ≤ 2nS(y) ≤ 2γ|y|,
and allocation xαT obtains welfare at most |y∩T |+ t ≤ 2αγ|y| ≤ 2γ|y|. So our approximation factor
is at least 1/2 in this case.
Suppose now that A′ is any algorithm for problem FV,S,T,α that is TIE. We will show that A′
is then very restricted in the allocations it can return on inputs y = V and y = U . Furthermore,
we note that if A′ has a good enough approximation ratio, then its allocations on inputs y = V
and y = U are restricted further still. In particular, the optimal allocation on both V and U is x1S ;
so to obtain a good approximation factor, on both U and V , the algorithm should allocate a large
enough amount to agents in U . As any TIE transformation of A is itself an algorithm for problem
FV,S,T,α, these observations will later play a key role in our impossibility result.
Claim 3.3. Suppose A′ is a truthful-in-expectation algorithm for problem FV,S,T,α. Then the ex-
pected allocation to each agent in U must be at least as large in A′(U) as in A′(V ).
Proof. Take any set W with V ⊆W ⊆ U , |W | = |V |+1. Then, on input W , the expected allocation
to the agent in W \ V must not decrease. Since all allocations are constant on U , this means that
the expected allocation to each agent in U must not decrease. By the same argument, A′ returns
an allocation at least this large for all W such that V ⊆W ⊆ U , and in particular for W = U .
In light of these claims, our strategy for proving Theorem 3.1 will be to show that a polytime
transformation T is unlikely to encounter the allocation xαT during its sampling when the input is
V , given that the sets V , S, and T are chosen uniformly at random over all admissible tuples. This
means the transformation will be unable to learn the value of α. This is key since it prevents the
transformation from using the value of α to appropriately randomize between the allocation of x1S
and the essentially empty allocation of xγ[n] to acheive an effective allocation of α for agents in U on
input V thereby satisfying the conditions of Claim 3.3. Similarly, a transformation is unlikely to
encounter the allocation x1S during its sampling on input U , and therefore can not satisfy Claim 3.3
by allocating 1 to agents in U on input U .
Lemma 3.4. Fix V and S satsifying the requirements of admissibility. Then for any y ⊆ [n],
PrT [AV,S,T,α(y) = xαT ] ≤ e−O(
t
r+1
), with probability taken over all choices of T that are admissible
given V and S.
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Proof. Fix any y. Write nV = |y ∩ V |, nS = |y ∩ (S − V )|, and n∗ = |y ∩ ([n] − S)|. Note
that |y| = nV + nS + n∗. Define the random variables mU and mT by mU = |y ∩ (U − V )| and
mT = |y ∩ (T\S)|.
The event [AV,S,T,α(y) = xαT ] occurs precisely if the following are true:
mT + 2nV + 2mU ≥ t, (1)
mT + 2nV + 2mU ≥ γ(nV + nS + n∗), (2)
mT + 2nV + 2mU ≥ nS + 3nV . (3)
We will show that the probability of these three inequalities being true is exponentially small.
To see this, note that (3) implies that mT + 2mU ≥ nV . Thus, (1) implies that mT + 2mU ≥ t/3,
and hence mT + mU ≥ t/6. Now each element of y counted in nS will count toward mU with
probability 1r+1 , and each element of y counted in n∗ will count toward mT with probability
1
r+1 .
Since t  r, Chernoff bounds imply that with probability at least 1 − e−O(t/r), we will have
n∗ + nS ≥ r2(mT +mU ). Then
mT + 2nV + 2mU
nV + nS + n∗
<
3(mT + 2mU )
nS + n∗
<
12
r
 γ
contradicting (2).
Lemma 3.5. Fix U and T satsifying the requirements of admissibility. Then for any y ⊆ [n],
PrS [AV,S,T,α(y) = x1S ] ≤ e−O(
t
r+1
), with probability taken over all choices of V and S that are
admissible given U and T .
Proof. Fix any y. Write nU = |y ∩ U |, nT = |y ∩ (T − U)|, and n∗ = |y ∩ ([n] − T )|. Note that
|y| = nU +nT +n∗. Define the random variables mV and mS by mV = |y∩V | and mS = |y∩(S\T )|.
The event [AV,S,T,α(y) = x1S ] occurs precisely if the following are true:
mS + nU + 2mV ≥ t, (4)
mS + nU + 2mV ≥ γ(nU + nT + n∗), (5)
mS + nU + 2mV ≥ nT + 2nU . (6)
We will show that the probability of these three inequalities being true is exponentially small.
To see this, first note that we can assume nT = 0, as this only loosens the requirements of the
inequalities. We then have that (6) implies mS + 2mV ≥ nU . Thus, (4) implies that mS + 2mV ≥
t/2, and hence mS + mV ≥ t/4. Now each element of y counted in nU will count toward mV
with probability 1r , and each element of y counted in n∗ will count toward mS with probability
1
r+1 . Since t  r, Chernoff bounds imply that with probability at least 1 − eO(t/r), we will have
n∗ + nT ≥ r2(mS +mV ). Then
mS + nU + 2mV
nU + n∗
<
4(mS +mV )
nU + n∗
<
8
r
 γ
contradicting (5).
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3.4 Proof of Main Theorem
We can now set our parameters t, r, α, and γ. We will choose t = n1/5, r = n3/20, and γ = n−2/20.
The values of α we will be considering are 1 and n−1/20. Note that t  r  γ−1  α−1 for each
choice of α. Note also that v = tγ−1/n = n−14/20  1.
Our idea now for proving Theorem 3.1 is that since the transformation can not determine the
value of α on input V (by Lemma 3.4), and since it can not find the “good” allocation of x1S on
input U (by Lemma 3.5), it must be pessimistic and allocate the minimum possible value of α to
agents in V on input V in order to guarantee that the resulting allocation rule is TIE (by Claim
3.3). This implies a bad approximation on input V and hence a bad worst-case approximation.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 : For each admissible V, S, T and α ∈ {1, n−1/20}, write A′V,S,T,α for
T (AV,S,T,α). Lemma 3.5 implies that, with all but exponentially small probability, A′V,S,T,α will not
encounter allocation x1S on input U . Thus, on input U , it can allocate at most α to each agent in
U in expectation (using the fact that α > γ). Then, since A′V,S,T,α is incentive compatible, Claim
3.3 implies that A′V,S,T,α must allocate at most α to each agent in U on input V .
Now Lemma 3.4 implies that, with all but exponentially small probability, A′V,S,T,α will not
encounter allocation xαT on input V , and thus is unaware of the value of α on input V . Thus, to
ensure incentive compatibility, A′V,S,T,1(V ) must allocate at most n−1/20 to each agent in U . It
therefore obtains a welfare of |V |n−1/20 + t ≤ n1/5 + n3/10 < n6/20, whereas a total of |V | = n7/20
is possible with allocation x1S . Thus A′V,S,T,1 has a worst-case approximation of n−1/20, whereas
AV,S,T,1 has an approximation factor of 1/6.
We conclude with a remark about extending our impossibility result to TIE transformations
under the weaker goal of preserving the expected social welfare under a given distribution F.
We would like to prove that, when agents’ values are drawn according to a distribution F, any
TIE transformation necessarily degrades the average welfare of some algorithm by a large factor.
The difficulty with extending our techniques to this setting is that a transformation may use
the distribution F to “guess” the relevant sets V and U (i.e. if the distribution is concentrated
around the sets V and U in our construction). One might hope to overcome this difficulty in our
construction by hiding a “true” set V (that generates a non-monotonicity) in a large sea of sets
that could potentially take the role of V . Then, if the transformation is unlikely to find a good
allocation on input U , and unlikely to determine the value of α on any of these potential sets, and
is further unable to determine which set is the “true” V , then it must be pessimistic and allocate
the minimum potential value of α on any of these potential sets in order to guarantee truthfulness.
Unfortunately, our construction assumes that all allocations are constant on U , and this makes it
difficult to hide a set V while simultaneously making it difficult to discover a good allocation on
input U . We feel that, in order to make progress on this interesting open question, it is necessary
to remove the assumption that all allocations are constant on U which, in hand, seems to make it
much more difficult to derive necessary conditions for a transformation to be TIE.
4 An Impossibility Result for Makespan
We now consider an objective function, namely makespan, that differs from the social welfare
objective in that it is not linear in agent values or allocations. Informally we show that black-
box reductions for approximation algorithms for makespan are not possible even if we relax the
notion of truthfulness to Bayesian incentive compatibility and relax the measure of performance to
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expected makespan, where both the notions are defined with respect to a certain fixed and known
distribution over values. As in the previous section, our impossibility result hinges on the fact that
the transformation is not aware of the feasibility constraint that an allocation needs to satisfy and
can learn this constraint only by querying the algorithm at different inputs.
4.1 Problem definition and main theorem
We consider the following minimization problem in a Bayesian setting. In this problem n selfish
machines (a.k.a. agents) are being allocated jobs. Each agent has a private value vi representing
its speed. If machine i is allocated jobs with a total length xi, the load of machine i is xi/vi. The
makespan of allocation x to machines with speeds v is the maximum load of any machine:
φ(x,v) = max
i
xi
vi
.
An instance of the (Bayesian) makespan problem is given by a feasibility constraint F and a
distribution over values F; the goal is to map every value vector to allocations so as to minimize
the expected makespan:
Ev∼F[φ(x(v),v)] subject to x(v) ∈ F for all v.
Given an algorithm A, we use φ(A) to denote its expected makespan.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 4.1. Let n be large enough and T be any black-box BIC transformation that makes
at most en
1/4/2 black-box queries to the given algorithm on each input. There exists an instance
(F ,F) of the makespan problem and a deterministic algorithm A such that T (A) either returns an
infeasible allocation with positive probability, or has makespan φ(T (A)) = Ω(n1/4)φ(A). Here F is
the uniform distribution over {1, α}n for an appropriate α and is known to T .
We note that the algorithm A in the statement of Theorem 4.1 is deterministic. A BIC transfor-
mation T must therefore degrade the makespan of some algorithms by a polynomially large factor
even when we limit ourselves to deterministic algorithms. For simplicity of exposition, we prove
a gap of Ω(n1/4), however, our construction can be tweaked to obtain a gap of Ω(n1/2−δ) for any
δ > 0.
Problem Instance. We now describe the problem instance (F ,F) in more detail. Let α < n1/2
be a parameter to be determined later. As mentioned earlier, F is the uniform distribution over
{1, α}n. That is, every value (i.e. speed) vi is 1 or α with equal probability. There are 2n jobs in all,
n of length α and n of length 1. Our feasibility constraint will have the property that each machine
can be assigned at most one job. So a valid allocation will set the allocation to each machine to a
value in {0, 1, α}.1
Of all such allocations (i.e. all x ∈ {0, 1, α}n), all but one will be feasible. This one infeasible
allocation is thought of as a parameter of the problem instance. Given x ∈ {0, 1, α}n, we will write
Fx as the set {0, 1, α}n \ x, and Γ(x) = (Fx,F) as the corresponding problem instance in which x
is infeasible. We will use xbad to denote the forbidden allocation in the remainder of this section.
1A makespan assignment must allocate each job to a machine, but we will sometimes wish to specify an allocation
in which not all jobs are allocated. For ease of exposition, we will therefore assume that there is an extra agent with
value n(α + 1); this agent will always be allocated all jobs not allocated to any other agent. Note that the load of
this machine is always at most 1.
12
The algorithm. We will first describe a randomized algorithm A(xbad) (Algorithm 2 below)
which we think of as an approximation algorithm for problem instance Γ(xbad).
Algorithm 2: Allocation Algorithm A(xbad)
Input: Vector v ∈ {1, α}n
Output: An allocation x 6= xbad
1 H ← {i : vi = α};
2 if 12n− n3/4 ≤ |H| ≤ 12n+ n3/4 then
3 Choose set S ⊂ H with |S| = n−1/2|H| uniformly at random;
4 for i ∈ S do xi ← α;
5 for i ∈ H \ S do xi ← 0;
6 for i 6∈ H do xi ← 1;
7 else
8 Choose set S ⊂ [n] with |S| = n3/4 uniformly at random;
9 for i ∈ S do xi ← α;
10 for i 6∈ S do xi ← 0;
11 end
12 if x = xbad then go to line 1;
13 return x
We first note that A(xbad) must terminate.
Claim 4.2. For all v, algorithm A(xbad) terminates with probability 1.
Proof. This follows from noting that at least two distinct allocations can be chosen by A(xbad) on
each branch of the condition on line 2, so A(xbad) must eventually choose an allocation that is not
xbad.
We now use A(xbad) to define a set of deterministic algorithms2. Let D(xbad) (or D for short)
denote the set of deterministic algorithms in the support of A(xbad). That is, for every A ∈ D, A(v)
is an allocation returned by A(xbad) on input v with positive probability for every v ∈ {1, α}n.
Moreover, for every combination of allocations that can be returned by A(xbad) on each input
profile, there is a corresponding deterministic algorithm in D.
For any v, let H(v) = {i : vi = α} be the set of high speed agents. Let C denote the event
that 12n − n3/4 ≤ |H(v)| ≤ 12n + n3/4, over randomness in v. We think of C as the event that
the number of high-speed agents is concentrated around its expectation. We note the following
immediate consequence of Chernoff bounds.
Observation 4.3. Prv[C] ≥ 1− 2e−n1/4/4.
This allows us to bound the expected makespan of each A ∈ D.
Lemma 4.4. For each A ∈ D, φ(A) ≤ 1 + 2αe−n1/4/4 where the expectation is taken over v.
2More precisely, we will define a set of deterministic allocation rules that map type profiles to allocations; in
particular we will not be concerned with implementations of these allocation rules.
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Proof. If event C occurs, then A returns an allocation in which each agent i with vi = 1 receives
allocation at most 1. Since each agent with vi = α also receives allocation at most α, we conclude
that if event C occurs then the makespan of A(v) is at most 1. Otherwise, the makespan of A(v) is
trivially bounded by α. Since Observation 4.3 implies that this latter case occurs with probability
at most 2e−n1/4/4, the result follows.
4.2 Transformation Analysis
We now present a proof of Theorem 4.1. Let T denote a BIC transformation that can make at most
en
1/4/2 black-box queries to an algorithm for makespan. Write T (A) for the mechanism induced
when T is given black-box access to an algorithm A.
We first note that if T (A) returns only feasible allocations with probability 1, then it can only
return an allocation that it observed during black-box queries to algorithm A. This is true even if
we consider only algorithms of the form A ∈ D(xbad) for some choice of xbad.
Claim 4.5. Suppose that for some A ∈ D, with positive probability, T returns an allocation not
returned by a black-box query to A. Then there exists an algorithm A′ such that TA′ returns an
infeasible allocation with positive probability.
Proof. Suppose that with positive probability TA returns the allocation x′ on A ∈ D(x) without
encountering it in a black box query to the algorithm A. Then there exists A′ ∈ D(x) such that
A′ and A agree on each input queried by T in some instance where TA returns x′, and furthermore
A′ never returns allocation x′ on any input. Note, then, that TA′ also returns allocation x′ with
positive probability. But A′ ∈ D(x′), so if we set xbad = x′ then we conclude that TA′ returns the
infeasible allocation x′ with positive probability.
In the remainder of the analysis we assume that T only returns observed allocations. We will
now think of xbad as being fixed, and A as being drawn from D(xbad) uniformly at random. Let B
denote the (bad) event, over randomness in v, T , and the choice of A ∈ D, that T (A) returns an
allocation with makespan α. Our goal will be to show that if T (A) is BIC for every A ∈ D, then
Pr[B] must be large; this will imply that the expected makespan of T (A) will be large for some
A ∈ D.
Intuitively, the reason that an algorithm A ∈ D may not be truthful is because low-speed
agents are often allocated 1 while high-speed agents are often allocated 0. In order to fix such non-
monotonicities, T must either increase the probability with which 1 is allocated to the high-speed
agents, or increase the probability with which 0 is allocated to the low-speed agents. To this end,
let U(v) be the event that, on input v, T (A) returns an allocation x in which at least n3/4 agents
satisfy vi = 1 and xi = 0.
As the following lemma shows, the event U(v) is unlikely to occur unless B also occurs. Then to
fix the non-monotonicity while avoiding B, T must rely on allocating 1 more often to the high-speed
agents. However this would require T to query A on speed vectors v′ that are near-complements
of v, and in turn imply a large-enough probability of allocating α to low-speed agents, i.e. event
B. We now make this intuition precise.
Lemma 4.6. For each v, Pr[U(v) ∧ ¬B|v] < (ln 4)e−n1/4/2.
Proof. Fix input v, and suppose that event U(v) ∧ ¬B occurs. Recall that T only returns an
allocation that A outputs on a query v′. We will refer to a query of A on input v′ as a successful
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query, if it returns an x that satisfies U(v) ∧ ¬B. Let us bound the probability of a single query
being successful. Let t denote the number of agents with vi = 1. Then U(v) implies t ≥ n3/4.
First, suppose that v′ does not satisfy the event C, that is, the number of high speed agents in
v′ is far from its mean n/2. Then each of the t agents has an n−1/4 probability of being allocated
α (taken over the choice of A from D). The probability that none of the t agents is allocated a
load of α is at most (1− n−1/4)t < e−n1/2 .
On the other hand, suppose that v′ satisfies the event C. Then U(v) implies that at least
t′ ≥ n3/4 agents satisfy vi = 1 and vi′ = α. In this case, each of these t′ agents has probability
n−1/2 of being allocated α. The probability that none of them is allocated a load of α is at most
(1− n−1/2)t′ < e−n1/4 .
In either case, the probability that a single query is successful is at most e−n1/4 . Transformation
T can make at most en1/4/2 queries on input v. We will now bound the probability that any one
of them is successful. First note that since A is deterministic, we can assume that T does not
query A more than once on the same input. Furthermore, we can think of the choice of A ∈ D as
independently selecting the behaviour of A for each input profile, so that the allocations returned
by A on different input profiles are independent with respect to the choice of A from D. We can
therefore think of the en
1/4
/2 queries as independent trials that are successful with probability at
most e−n1/4 . Thus, the probability that at least one of these queries is successful is at most
1− (1− e−n1/4)en
1/4/2
= 1− (1− e−n1/4)en
1/4
e−n
1/4/2
< 1− (1/4)e−n
1/4/2
= 1− (1/e)(ln 4)e−n
1/4/2
< (ln 4)e−n
1/4/2
as required.
We now consider the specific probabilities with which T returns high or low allocations on high
or low values. For agent i, value v, and allocation x, we will write pxi (v) = Prv−i,A,T [xi(v,v−i) = x].
That is, pxi (v) is the probability that conditioned on agent i’s value being v, T (A) allocates x to
the agent; Here the probability is over the values of the other agents, any randomness in T , and
the choice of A ∈ D.
Observation 4.7.
∑
i p
x
i (v) = 2
∑
i Prv[(vi = v) ∧ (xi(v) = x)].
We can express the fact that T satisfies BIC in terms of conditions on these probabilities
(Lemma 4.8 below): either p0i (1) should be large, i.e. low-speed agents get a low allocation, or one
of p1i (α) and p
α
i (α) should be large, i.e. high-speed agents get a high allocation. On the other hand,
in Lemmas 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 we show that on average over all agents, each of these probabilities
is small if the probability of the bad event B is small. The proofs of these lemmas are deferred to
the end of this section. In Lemma 4.12 we put these results together to argue that B occurs with
a large probability.
Lemma 4.8. Let x be the allocation rule of T (A). Then if xi(1) ≤ xi(α), p0i (1) < 1/3, and
p1i (α) < 1/3, then p
α
i (α) > 3/α.
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Proof. Since p0i (1) <
1
3 , we have xi(1) >
2
3 . Since p
1
i (α) <
1
3 , we have xi(α) <
1
3 + p
α
i (α)α. We
conclude that 23 <
1
3 + p
α
i (α)α which implies the desired result.
Lemma 4.9. 12n
∑
i p
α
i (α) ≤ n−
1
2 + Pr[B]n−1/4 + 2e−n1/4/4n−1/4 + (ln 4)e−n1/4/2n−1/4.
Lemma 4.10. 12n
∑
i p
0
i (1) ≤ n−1/4 + Pr[B] + (ln 4)e−n
1/4/2.
Lemma 4.11. 12n
∑
i p
1
i (α) ≤ 3n−1/4 + Pr[B] + (ln 4)e−n
1/4/2 + 2e−n1/4/4.
The above lemmas put together give a lower bound for Pr[B]. Set α = 14n
1/2.
Lemma 4.12. Pr[B] ≥ n−1/4 − 2e−n1/4/4 − (ln 4)e−n1/4/2.
Proof. We know that, for each i, either p0i (1) ≥ 1/3, p1i (α) ≥ 1/3, or pαi (α) > 3/α. So one of these
inequalities must be true for at least one third of the agents, and hence one of the following must
be true:
1
2n
∑
i
p0i (1) ≥ 1/18
1
2n
∑
i
p1i (α) ≥ 1/18
1
2n
∑
i
pαi (α) ≥ 1/2α.
Suppose the first inequality is true. Then by Lemma 4.10 we know
Pr[B] ≥ 1/18− n−1/4 − (ln 4)e−n1/4/2
which implies the desired result for sufficiently large n (as the right hand side is at least a constant
for large n, whereas n−1/4 − 2e−n1/4/4 − (ln 4)e−n1/4/2, from the statement of the lemma, vanishes
as n grows).
Suppose the second inequality is true. Then we know from Lemma 4.11
Pr[B] ≥ 1/18− 3n−1/4 − (ln 4)e−n1/4/2 − 2e−n1/4/4
which again implies the desired result.
Finally, suppose the third inequality is true. Then we know from Lemma 4.9
n−
1
2 + Pr[B]n−1/4 + 2e−n
1/4/4n−1/4 + (ln 4)e−n
1/4/2n−1/4 ≥ 1/2α
which implies (recalling α = 14n
1/2)
Pr[B] ≥ (2n− 12 − n− 12 )n1/4 − 2e−n1/4/4 − (ln 4)e−n1/4/2 = n−1/4 − 2e−n−1/4/4 − (ln 4)e−n1/4/2
as required.
We can now prove our main result.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Write Pr[B | A] for the probability of event B given that T is given black-
box access to algorithm A, with probability over the choice of input profile v. Choose A′ ∈
argmaxA∈D{Pr[B | A]}. Then in particular Pr[B | A] ≥ Pr[B], where recall that Pr[B] is the
probability of event B when A is chosen uniformly at random from D.
Recall that we set α = 14n
1/2. By Lemma 4.4 the expected makespan of A′ is at most 1 +
2αe−n1/4/4 = 1 + 12n
1/2e−n1/4/4 < 2 for large enough n. Using Lemma 4.12, the expected makespan
of TA′ is at least
1 + αPr[B|A′] ≥ 1 + αPr[B]
≥ 1 + α(n−1/4 − 2e−n1/4/4 − (ln 4)e−n1/4/2)
= 1 +
1
4
n1/4 − 1
2
n1/2e−n
1/4/4 −
(
ln 4
4
)
n1/2e−n
1/4/2
≥ 1
4
n1/4
as required.
Proofs of bounds on the allocation probabilities. To conclude the analysis, we now present
proofs of Lemmas 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11.
Proof of Lemma 4.9. Let us first condition on the event ¬B ∧¬U(v)∧C. That is, we consider the
output of T (A) on a value vector v that satisfies the concentration event C, and further assume
that the makespan of T (A) is small (¬B) and few agents with vi = 1 have a 0 allocation (¬U(v)).
C implies that many of the agents (at least 12n−n3/4) in v are low-speed agents. Along with ¬B
and ¬U(v) this implies that most of these agents have an allocation of 1; Call this set of agents L.
Then |L| > 12n−2n3/4. In particular L is non-empty. Now suppose that T (A) returns an allocation
x that is returned by A on input v′. Then, since L is non-empty, v′ must satisfy the condition on
line 2 of A(xbad) (as this is the only way in which any agent can be allocated 1, regardless of the
choice of A ∈ D). This implies that at most n1/2 agents get an allocation of α because S is of size
at most n1/2.
We conclude that for fixed v satisfying C and conditioning on ¬B ∧ ¬U(v),
1
n
∑
i
Pr[(vi = α) ∧ (xi(α,v−i) = α)] ≤ 1
n
n
1
2 = n−
1
2 .
For the case that events B, ¬C, or U(v) occur, we note that every allocation returned by T (A)
allocates α to at most n3/4 agents. So, conditioning on either of these events, we have
1
n
∑
i
Pr[(vi = α) ∧ (xi(α,v−i) = α)] ≤ n−1/4.
We conclude, taking probabilities over all v, that
1
2n
∑
i
p0i (1) ≤ n−
1
2 + Pr[B]n−1/4 + Pr[¬C]n−1/4 + Pr[U(v) ∧ ¬B]n−1/4
≤ n− 12 + Pr[B]n−1/4 + 2e−n1/4/4n−1/4 + (ln 4)e−n1/4/2n−1/4
as required.
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Proof of Lemma 4.10. For each input vector v, either event ¬U(v) occurs, event B occurs, or event
U(v)∧¬B occurs. Event ¬U(v) by definition gives us a bound on the number of agents with value
1 that receive an allocation of 0. So conditioning on this event (and keeping v fixed) we have
1
n
∑
i
Pr[(vi = 1) ∧ (xi(1,v−i) = 0)] ≤ 1
n
n3/4 = n−1/4.
Thus, taking probabilities over all v, we have
1
2n
∑
i
p0i (1) ≤ n−1/4 + Pr[B] + Prv [U(v) ∧ ¬B|v] ≤ n
−1/4 + Pr[B] + (ln 4)e−n
1/4/2
as required.
Proof of Lemma 4.11. Let us first fix v and condition on the event ¬B ∧¬U(v)∧C. Suppose that
T (A) returns an allocation x that is returned by A on input v′.
As in the proof of Lemma 4.9, event ¬B ∧ ¬U(v) ∧ C implies that T (A) returns an allocation
in which some agents are allocated 1. We therefore conclude that v′ satisfies the condition on line
2 of A(xbad). This implies
−2n3/4 ≤ |H(v)| − |H(v′)| ≤ 2n3/4.
Furthermore, ¬U(v) ∧ ¬B implies that |H(v′)\H(v)| ≤ n3/4. Combining with the inequalities
above, we conclude that |H(v)\H(v′)| ≤ 2n3/4 + n3/4. Note that this is a bound on the number
of agents such that vi = α and vi
′ = 1, which is also a bound on the number of agents such that
vi = α and xi = 1.
We conclude that, conditioning on event ¬B ∧ ¬U(v) ∧ C and keeping v fixed, we have
1
n
∑
i
Pr[(vi = α) ∧ (xi(α,v−i) = 1)] ≤ 1
n
(3n3/4).
Thus, taking probabilities over all v and all events, we have
1
2n
∑
i
p0i (1) ≤ 3n−1/4 + Pr[B] + Prv [U(v) ∧ ¬B|v] + Pr[¬C]
≤ 3n−1/4 + Pr[B] + (ln 4)e−n1/4/2 + 2e−n1/4/4
as required.
5 Additive objective functions
In Section 4 we showed that no BIC approximation-preserving transformations are possible for
the makespan objective. One of the properties of the social welfare objective that allows a BIC
transformation where one cannot exist for makespan is that the objective function is additive across
agents. This allows a transformation to focus on each agent individually while taking an aggregate
view over other agents and preserving the performance with respect to the respective component
of the objective function alone. [12] and [11] formalize this idea as follows: for each agent i they
construct a mapping gi from the value space of i to itself, and on input v return the output of the
algorithm on g(v) = (g1(v1), g2(v2), · · · ). The mappings gi ensure the following three properties:
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(P.1) the mapping preserves the distribution over values of i,
(P.2) the expected allocation of agent i upon applying the mapping, i.e. xi(gi(vi)), is monotone
non-decreasing in vi, and,
(P.3) the contribution of agent i to the overall social welfare is no worse than in the original
algorithm.
The benefit of this approach is that if each agent’s value space is single-dimensional or well struc-
tured in some other way, the computational problem of finding such a mapping becomes easy.
Given this construction, it is natural to ask whether there are other objectives that are additive
across agents and for which such a per-agent ironing procedure works. We show in this section that
for almost any objective other than social welfare, such an approach cannot work. In particular,
given an objective satisfying some mild properties, we construct an instance such that for any
mapping gi from agent i’s value space to itself that satisfies properties (P.1) and (P.2) above,
property (P.3) fails to hold by an arbitrarily large factor.
We focus first on maximization problems. Note that for an objective function of the form
maxEv[
∑
i xi(v)hi(vi)] where his are non-decreasing functions, the approach of [12] and [11] works
as-is to give a BIC approximation preserving transformation. In the sequel, we consider objectives
of the form maxEv[
∑
i hi(xi(v))vi] where hi is an arbitrary non-linear continuous function.
Theorem 5.1. Consider the objective maxEv[
∑
i hi(xi(v))vi] where each hi is an arbitrary in-
creasing function. Suppose that there exists an agent i for which hi is a continuous super-linear
function (i.e. hi(x) = ω(x)) or a continuous sub-linear function (i.e. hi(x) = o(x)). Then for any
 ∈ (0, 1), there exists a distribution over agent values and an algorithm A such that any transfor-
mation that performs a per-agent ironing of the allocation function of A achieving properties (P.1)
and (P.2) above, must violate property (P.3) by a factor of Ω(1/).
Proof. We focus on a single agent i and drop the subscript i to improve readability. Our algorithm
makes non-zero allocations only to agent i so that the contribution of other agents to the objective
is 0. Let h be the corresponding continuous increasing function and assume wlog that h(0) = 0
and h(1) = 1. In the remainder of the proof we assume that h is super-linear. The proof for the
sub-linear case is similar.
With respect to this agent, our goal is to maximize the objective E[h(x(v))v]. Fix any  > 0
and consider the following instance and algorithm. The agent’s value is 0 with probability 1− and
1 with probability . At 0, the algorithm always allocates an amount 1 + ′. At 1, the allocation
is 0 with probability 1 − 1/k and k with probability 1/k. Here we pick ′ > 0 and k such that
h(1 + ′) < 1/(1 − ) and h(k) > k/. The existence of ′ and k follows from the fact that h is
continuous and superlinear.
Now, the expected allocation at 1 is 1, so in order to produce a BIC output, the mapping g
must map each of the values to the other with some probability. Suppose that 0 gets mapped to 1
with probability z/(1− ) for some z. Then, to preserve the distribution over values, we must have
z ≤  and 1 must get mapped to 0 with probability z/.
How large does z have to be to fix the non-monotonicity? The new expected allocation at 0 is
z/(1− ) + (1− z/(1− ))(1 + ′), while the new expected allocation at 1 is (1− z/) + z/(1 + ′).
Setting the former to be no larger than the latter, and rearranging terms, we get
z/(1− ) + z/ ≥ 1
19
implying z ≥ (1− ).
Let us now compute the objective function value. The original objective function value is
h(k)/k. The new objective function value is given by
(z/h(1 + ′) + (1− z/)h(k)/k) < z/(1− ) + (− z)h(k)/k
< h(k)/k(− z + z/(1− ))
= h(k)/k(− (1− 2)z/(1− ))
< 22h(k)/k
Here the first inequality follows from h(1 + ′) < 1/(1 − ), the second from 1 < h(k)/k and the
fourth from z ≥ (1− ). This implies that any mapping g that satisfies properties (P.1) and (P.2)
must violate property (P.3) by a factor of at least 1/2.
A similar example can be constructed for sub-linear continuous h, and we skip the details.
Next we consider minimization problems of the form minEv[
∑
i hi(xi(v))h
′
i(vi)] where his are
non-decreasing functions and h′is are non-increasing functions. Once again, if there exists an i such
that hi is non-linear, we get a gap.
Theorem 5.2. Consider the objective maxEv[
∑
i hi(xi(v))h
′
i(vi)] where each hi is an arbitrary
increasing function and each h′i is an arbitrary continuous decreasing function. Suppose that there
exists an agent i for which hi is a continuous super-linear function (i.e. hi(x) = ω(x)) or a
continuous sub-linear function (i.e. hi(x) = o(x)). Then for any  > 0, there exists a distribution
over agent values and an algorithm A such that any transformation that performs a per-agent
ironing of the allocation function of A achieving properties (P.1) and (P.2) above, must violate
property (P.3) by a factor of Ω(1/).
Proof. Once again we focus on the agent i and present the proof for the case where the function
h (the subscript i being implicit) is continuous and super-linear. The proof for the sub-linear case
is similar. Assume without loss of generality that h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1. Let k ≥ 1 be such that
h(k) > k/. Let v1 = h
′−1(1) and v2 = h′−1(/k). Agent i’s value distribution is uniform over
{v1, v2}.
The algorithm A is defined as follows. At v1, the algorithm returns x1 with h(x1) = 1 + . Note
that x1 > 1. At v2, the algorithm returns k with probability 1/k and 0 otherwise. The expected
allocation is 1, and therefore the allocation is non-monotone. Suppose that the tranformation maps
v1 to v2 with probability z and vice versa. Then it is easy to see that z > 1/2.
Now let us compute the objective function value. The objective function value of the original
algorithm is 1/2(1 + ) + 1/2/k(h(k)/k) = 1/2 + /2(1 +h(k)/k2) < 1 + h(k)/2k2. We can bound
from below the objective function value of the transformed mechanism by considering the term
corresponding to value v1 when the allocation is k (an event that happens with probability 1/2
times z times 1/k). The new objective function value is therefore at least
zh(k)/2k ≥ h(k)/4k
≥ 1/8+ h(k)/16k2 = 1/8(1 + h(k)/2k2)
Here the second inequality follows by using h(k) > k/ and k > 1/2. This implies that any
transformation that satisfies properties (1) and (2) must violate property (3) by a factor of at least
1/8.
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To conclude this section we note that for minimization problems with objectives of the form
Ev[
∑
i xi(v)h
′
i(vi)] where h
′
is are decreasing functions, an approach similar to the ironing approach
of [11] gives a BIC approximation-preserving transformation. In particular, if the type space for
each agent is finite then we can find a mapping by finding the min-cost perfect matching where
edge costs between vi and vi
′ are h′i(vi)Ev−i [xi(vi
′,v−i)].
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